Milgram experiment Essay

The infamous â€Å"Milgram experiment† on obedience, done in 1963, is, perhaps, the most commonly known of all psychological experiments. It gained its infamy for its use of subjects who did not know they were being tested. Since the experiment dealt with a highly stressful situation – the necessity to inflict pain at command – upon the publishing of its result, it raised a wave of debate on whether such an experiment is acceptable ethically. Nonetheless, the experiment produced interesting and controversial results – at the very least in the fact that it utterly disproved the claims of most psychologists. The psychologists had argued that only a tiny, sadistic percent of the population would be able to commonly inflict pain on command, simply obeying orders. The experiment clearly showed that 65 percent would obey authority if required, giving an alternative explanation to the phenomenon of concentration camps. Rather than sadism, the experiment shows, most people are simply obedient when the appropriate stress factors are applied. This experiment, naturally, had a variety of interesting consequences, both for psychology and the study of the later social reaction to the experiment itself. The †legend† told to the participants of the experiment was that the scientists were studying the effect of punishment on learning. The subject had to deliver an electric shock when an actor who was playing the role of the learner answered a question incorrectly. Naturally, no real shocks were given. As time passed, the subject was ordered to give progressively â€Å"stronger† punishment shocks. Most of the subjects eventually delivered what they thought were high-intensity, potentially lethal shocks in spite of serious distress on the part of the person who was playing the role of the learner. The result also gave interesting variations: many more people stopped earlier when the main scientist was not present in the room and gave his orders by voice, without the use of facial expression; when two experimenters who gave conflicting orders were present, the subject halted the instant conflicts in authority began; when another â€Å"teacher† was present, and started protesting, most joined into the protest; and, finally, if the test subject was not ordered to inflict the pain, but merely to read the words, 37 out of 40 people assumed an instrumental role, and passively watched the scientist inflict pain (Milgram, 1963). As the Milgram experiment clearly demonstrates, most people will react positively to having authority taken from them. After giving consent, most will protest weakly, passively. The test subject known as Prozi, for instance, voiced his complaints, but at being told firmly that the experiment was a necessity, continued to go on (Milgram, 1963). Despite the fact that, once explained what the experiment was, many people experienced regret, still, quite a few people trusted authority. One of the reasons not commonly noted is the effect of specialization of labor. In American society, where one goes to a specialist for every single bit of work that requires even a small bit of knowledge above the general level, it becomes almost a reflex to trust specialists. This is because most people are largely ignorant of their surroundings, and this feel assertive only within their sphere of competence. When encountering something beyond it, very few people will initially attempt to experiment. Most will try to find â€Å"an expert†, someone who is knowledgeable about a certain phenomenon or circumstance. Moral imperatives only truly come into play when a person has to make a choice without outside pressure. However, when pressured by someone who supposedly knows better, not too many question authority. This is a case of personal morality versus the trust in the experimenter’s morality: most people assume the better of the experimenter, and deduct that, without a necessity, the experiment would not be conducted. It is also interesting to note that when experimenters were in conflict, the test subject stops immediately. This reaction to divided authority also confirms the thesis given above. However, the stronger the emphasis on necessity and responsibility – both qualities enforced culturally as necessary for survival within society – the subjects become much more submissive. This may be interpreted as the fact that most people have a different real moral code than the one they announce. As Milgram duly notes, only the illusion of necessity was created. The subjects were not threatened, nor were they explicitly told they would be punished, and thus, the choice was much easier than under any explicit threat. The stress factor is the most common reason this experiment is criticized as â€Å"inhumane†, and even â€Å"torture†. Specifically, the scientist Diana Baumrind raised the ethical points of the study to public concern. She spoke of the experiment as being emotionally distressing, destructive to the self-image of the subject once he realizes the true cruelty of his actions, and the fact that the study creates a distrust of authority (Baumrind, 1964). Out of these three points of rebuttal, none are legitimate. The experiment was emotionally distressing, true, and yet 84 percent of the subjects said that they were glad they had participated after the experiment. Indeed, for a great many of them it was equivocal to an awakening as to the things they were able to do, a reason to reconsider their own behavior. The second point is also true only in a certain way. The experiment was destructive to the self-image of these people, but in a positive way. It removed a number of illusions and taught lessons. This debunking is how a human being learns how to deal with perpetual dissuasions about his own validity, and most well-adapted humans should accept this as yet another such case – as the exit survey by Milgram demonstrates rather clearly. Her third point is that belief in authority would be undermined. Once more, the debriefing only reinforces this belief. Despite what seemed to be, initially, a situation in which authority is undermined, once the test subject is informed of what has happened, he is once more reassured that the experiment has done no real and lasting harm. In short, the experiment only reinforces the authority of the scientifical community and its concern with the good of mankind, which is not created at the expense of its certain members. Thus, we can see rather clearly that ethically this experiment was flawless. . Still, if flawless ethically, the question arises of whether the experiment is so flawless methodologically. Ian Parker, in his article â€Å"Obedience† raises the question of whether the experiment was not so easily debunked by the test subjects. Some interviews with those who participated also show that many had suspicions, and a certain amount even said that the experiment was a fraud from the beginning and they knew it. Parker thus argues that the results are flawed: the whole point of deceiving the test subjects is gone when they understand that the experiment is only a test (Parker, 2000). However, this assumption is also rather faulty. What Parker seemingly fails to take into account is that the subjects enter a situation of uncertainty. As the interviews show, even when the subjects expressed guesses towards being tested, the actors continued the game. If their suspicions had been confirmed immediately, Parker’s argument would have made sense. But in this manner, they are put into a situation, where it suddenly becomes irrelevant whether this is an experiment of some kind or not. One simply does not know whether it is real or a game. In any case, those who would accept the situation as possibly real, are, once more, faced with the consequences of a dire moral dilemma. And I would also surmise that most people with at least average courage would assume the reality of such an experiment, if only out of fear of the consequences if it somehow turns out to be real. Even outright disbelief will not necessarily destroy the experience of doubting whether one is included in this experiment or not. Thus, Parker’s criticism is also irrelevant to the bulk of the data in question. Thus we can see how Milgram’s experiment effectively demonstrates the mechanisms and reasons for obedience. Milgram shows the extent to which the human mind is much like an animal’s, and how easily it can be conditioned, and also how cultural conditions add to the basic instinct of obeying someone with higher social status. The experiment is rather educational in demonstrating how much the average human examines his own behavior and learns of how he will behave in a particular situation, and how such examination might be crucial to making life-and-death choices. It is not cruel – in effect, it could have been made much harsher by invoking even further uncertainty and examining the subjects’ long-term reactions to their own behavior. Yet most of the post-effects have been beneficial without any significant damage to the participants. And not ineffective – in fact, the data gathered could be useful for an even further analysis on the effect of uncertainty on the psyche. To conclude: this is one of the more interesting, beneficial and effective experiments done in psychology, and it gives us an insight into the human mind that should not be ignored or derailed for false reasons.

Internal Control and Shady Accounting Practices

Group 3 1. Why did accounting fraud occur at WorldCom? Fraud occurred at WorldCom for a variety of reasons. The senior executives had unchecked power because the board of directors were only figure heads, the ethics hot-line was nonfunctional, and in internal audit department did report to the appropriate link in the corporate chain to minimize fraud. These reasons, combined with a poor company culture, created the environment where fraud was able to become an acceptable business process. The senior executives at WorldCom had a â€Å"do it or else† attitude that was unchecked by any external force.That external force should have been the board of directors. Unfortunately the board of directors were being directed by the senior executives, given information about WorldCom that was disorganized to hide highly controversial and aggressive accounting techniques. These directors should have recognized they were being used and realized their agency to the stock holders to administer the oversight they were compensated to provide. The ethics hot-line, according to the case, while existed, was not known or trusted by the general population of employees at WorldCom.While many employees were aware of unethical activity, no of them felt that using this channel was a viable solution to addressing problems at WorldCom. Finally, the Internal audit department reported to the senior executive who ultimately steered their activity. If the executive was informed that internal audit was close to uncovering the unethical acts of managers, he directed their internal activity to other areas of the firm and blocked access to their department to the files that could expose the problem.If the internal audit department reported to the board of directors, better policing of executive activity would have been possible. All of these reasons had an element of poor culture in their makeup. Allowing senior executives to bullying their subordinates, inattentive directors, allowing for t he ethics channel to be nonfunctional, and accepting the unethical actions of seniors as the way things get done, ultimately doomed WorldCom to a spiral of actions that had the momentum of everyone's livelihood at stake, with no system in place to automatically apply the brakes to protect the shareholders. . What is the difference between earnings management (or earnings smoothing) and accounting fraud? What are the relevant criteria to use in distinguishing ethical from unethical accounting practices? I don't think there is a difference between earning smoothing and accounting fraud. Both practices intentionally mislead investors to alter their opinion of their holdings. Even if altering earning to smooth it out is mean only to put investors at ease, the underlying goal of smoothing is to change the perception of risk and volatility, which demand premiums in the market.Relevant criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical accounting practices are if the accounting practice ma terially changes what the average investor values the company at and items addressed in GAAP and other accounting standards that are against conventional accounting guidelines actively used and unchallenged in the business landscape. 3. What internal processes or systems do you recommend to prevent fraudulent practices such as those present at WorldCom?Why were these practices not detected sooner? It appears WorldCom's fraudulent activities was uncovered by the companies own internal accounting department, indicating that at least one of five internal controls – â€Å"monitoring of controls† was functional. However, I believe if there were to have been periodic external auditing from impartial entities outside of WorldCom, the fraudulent activities would have been uncovered sooner than it occurred in 2005.Other internal control processes that could have prevented WorldCom's fraudulent activities and demise are; hiring competent, reliable and ethical personnel, particul arly in leadership positions that the company's board of trustees failed to accomplish, or perhaps were oblivious and complacent with the â€Å"red flag warnings† – falsely professed financial growth and profitability to increase the price of WorldCom's stock, and underreporting line costs (interconnection expenses with other telecommunication companies) by capitalizing these costs on the balance sheet rather than properly expensing them.In addition to inflating revenues with bogus accounting entries from corporate unallocated revenue accounts. I also believe there was failure with â€Å"assignment of duties†, or separation of duties if you will. Because, Mr. Ebber's seems to have been in control of his CFO – Sullivan, Controller – Myers, and Director of General Accounting – Yates. All of whom were unethical leaders at WorldCom that helped concoct â€Å"shady† accounting practices that led to the demise of WorldCom. It is my opinion t hat the above mentioned practices were not detected early enough due to micro management of lower taff employees by unethical leadership through autocratic style leadership, and environment that instilled fear in employees for fear of losing their jobs if any concerns were raised. An unfortunate reality that sadly exist in many big corporations, and even in governments. 4. What external processes or systems do you recommend to prevent and detect fraudulent practices such as those present at WorldCom? Were the directors on the board or the external auditors to be blamed?External auditing is an effective process that can in many ways prevent fraudulent activities within organizations, as the respective auditing teams have no â€Å"loyalty† to management or leadership within the company undergoing review by the external auditors. Retrospectively, I believe that the board of trustees of WorldCom at the time of the scandal would have wished that they had carefully looked into the background and leadership style of Mr. Ebber's and his co-conspirators to have checked for any signs of unethical behavior that many companies continue to blindly ignore.Barely about a year ago, Yahoo's former CEO was publicly humiliated, and subsequently fired by the company for â€Å"embellishing his academic credentials†. A very minor issue that could have been easily prevented, had the board of trustees of Yahoo looked thoroughly into Thompson's background by doing their due diligence. Unfortunately, the board of trustees of Yahoo failed at this task, much like what happened back in the late nineties with WorldCom and Ebber's. 5. You are a representative from the SEC.Briefly describe any sections of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that you would cite to either Mr. Sullivan or Mr. Ebber's when they refuse to comply with your request for information. Under the federal regulations and securities Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C. 78c(a)(47)), ref usal of any individual(s), or company(s) to conform to set accounting practices including external auditing by appropriate personnel (entities) will be liable to punitive actions set forth by federal legislations – up to or more than 25-years imprisonment and fines.Additionally, accounting and auditing practices by firms and individuals associated with a particular entity, or provide other services to any or such entities are prohibited to prevent conflict of interest, and accurate reporting of accounting practices. All of which were corporate infractions engaged in by Mr. Ebber's and his co-conspirators at WorldCom. 6. The E/R ratios of other telecommunications companies during the late 1990’s hovered around 50% or at best high 40%. If you were an investor, would you have invested in WorldCom? I probably would have.Despite the fact that WorldCom's E/R ratio seems to have been lower than its competitors , which should have raised a red flag in any potential investors m ind. However, like my decision to still invest in WorldCom despite its â€Å"too good to be E/R ratios†, many investors back then may have ignored what was obvious because WorldCom's â€Å"cooked books† from previous years all â€Å"seemed financially sound†, thanks to Ebber's and his co-conspirators great efforts at evading external auditors, fooling the public and its shareholders, and â€Å"muscling† junior employees to cover up its â€Å"shady accounting practices†.So naturally, any potential investor would probably back then have made the same mistake of investing in WorldCom. Obviously, not expensing largest operating expense â€Å"line costs† – incurred to gain access to other carriers networks to allow WorldCom to complete customers calls, as reported in its SEC filings will make its E/R ratio lower compared to WorldCom's competitors, resulting in an â€Å"inflated performance† – overstatement of earnings and und erstatement of operating expenses. 7. Contrast the roles of Vinson and Cooper in the case.Should Vinson have been charged with committing crime? According to the section â€Å"Resolution of Ethical Conflict† in the Institute of Management Accountants' Code of Ethics, how should employees proceed when under pressure by senior managers to engage in unethical behavior? As stated by James Comey, the U. S. attorney that prosecuted Ms. Vinson's case, â€Å"just following orders† is not an excuse to break the law. Why? Because, like many accounting professionals, Ms. Vinson knew right from wrong as it pertains to the prescriptive law of accounting ethical practices.In her own statement and admissions to prosecutors during the initial stages of her prosecution, and attempt to become a witness for the prosecution to gain leniency. (Pulliam, 2003). She (Ms. Vinson) stated that â€Å"each time she was ordered to â€Å"cook† or cover unethical accounting practices, she tho ught and hoped it will be the last time she caved in for such unscrupulous activities. Unfortunately, she kept on caving for years till the scandal was uncovered†. In light of the facts, and Ms.Vinson and Cooper's knowledge of right and wrong concerning the ethical practices of their chosen professions, it is appropriate for both of them to have been held liable for conspiring and engaging in such fraudulent activities as purported by WorldCom. As outlined by the IMA, accounting professionals in any company that are micro-managed, â€Å"muscled†, or coerced to engage in any fraudulent activities or witness any such improprieties, should first report the issue to an immediate supervisor that is not involve in such activities.In the event such option does not exist, one should then report the issue to a higher management staff that is not involved in such impropriety. it's also advisable for one to seek legal counseling with a private attorney about how to proceed in such matters n the event that reporting to an external body is imminent. Reference:PULLIAM, S. , Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Online, June 23, 2003| | Internal Control and Shady Accounting Practices Group 3 1. Why did accounting fraud occur at WorldCom? Fraud occurred at WorldCom for a variety of reasons. The senior executives had unchecked power because the board of directors were only figure heads, the ethics hot-line was nonfunctional, and in internal audit department did report to the appropriate link in the corporate chain to minimize fraud. These reasons, combined with a poor company culture, created the environment where fraud was able to become an acceptable business process. The senior executives at WorldCom had a â€Å"do it or else† attitude that was unchecked by any external force.That external force should have been the board of directors. Unfortunately the board of directors were being directed by the senior executives, given information about WorldCom that was disorganized to hide highly controversial and aggressive accounting techniques. These directors should have recognized they were being used and realized their agency to the stock holders to administer the oversight they were compensated to provide. The ethics hot-line, according to the case, while existed, was not known or trusted by the general population of employees at WorldCom.While many employees were aware of unethical activity, no of them felt that using this channel was a viable solution to addressing problems at WorldCom. Finally, the Internal audit department reported to the senior executive who ultimately steered their activity. If the executive was informed that internal audit was close to uncovering the unethical acts of managers, he directed their internal activity to other areas of the firm and blocked access to their department to the files that could expose the problem.If the internal audit department reported to the board of directors, better policing of executive activity would have been possible. All of these reasons had an element of poor culture in their makeup. Allowing senior executives to bullying their subordinates, inattentive directors, allowing for t he ethics channel to be nonfunctional, and accepting the unethical actions of seniors as the way things get done, ultimately doomed WorldCom to a spiral of actions that had the momentum of everyone's livelihood at stake, with no system in place to automatically apply the brakes to protect the shareholders. . What is the difference between earnings management (or earnings smoothing) and accounting fraud? What are the relevant criteria to use in distinguishing ethical from unethical accounting practices? I don't think there is a difference between earning smoothing and accounting fraud. Both practices intentionally mislead investors to alter their opinion of their holdings. Even if altering earning to smooth it out is mean only to put investors at ease, the underlying goal of smoothing is to change the perception of risk and volatility, which demand premiums in the market.Relevant criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical accounting practices are if the accounting practice ma terially changes what the average investor values the company at and items addressed in GAAP and other accounting standards that are against conventional accounting guidelines actively used and unchallenged in the business landscape. 3. What internal processes or systems do you recommend to prevent fraudulent practices such as those present at WorldCom?Why were these practices not detected sooner? It appears WorldCom's fraudulent activities was uncovered by the companies own internal accounting department, indicating that at least one of five internal controls – â€Å"monitoring of controls† was functional. However, I believe if there were to have been periodic external auditing from impartial entities outside of WorldCom, the fraudulent activities would have been uncovered sooner than it occurred in 2005.Other internal control processes that could have prevented WorldCom's fraudulent activities and demise are; hiring competent, reliable and ethical personnel, particul arly in leadership positions that the company's board of trustees failed to accomplish, or perhaps were oblivious and complacent with the â€Å"red flag warnings† – falsely professed financial growth and profitability to increase the price of WorldCom's stock, and underreporting line costs (interconnection expenses with other telecommunication companies) by capitalizing these costs on the balance sheet rather than properly expensing them.In addition to inflating revenues with bogus accounting entries from corporate unallocated revenue accounts. I also believe there was failure with â€Å"assignment of duties†, or separation of duties if you will. Because, Mr. Ebber's seems to have been in control of his CFO – Sullivan, Controller – Myers, and Director of General Accounting – Yates. All of whom were unethical leaders at WorldCom that helped concoct â€Å"shady† accounting practices that led to the demise of WorldCom. It is my opinion t hat the above mentioned practices were not detected early enough due to micro management of lower taff employees by unethical leadership through autocratic style leadership, and environment that instilled fear in employees for fear of losing their jobs if any concerns were raised. An unfortunate reality that sadly exist in many big corporations, and even in governments. 4. What external processes or systems do you recommend to prevent and detect fraudulent practices such as those present at WorldCom? Were the directors on the board or the external auditors to be blamed?External auditing is an effective process that can in many ways prevent fraudulent activities within organizations, as the respective auditing teams have no â€Å"loyalty† to management or leadership within the company undergoing review by the external auditors. Retrospectively, I believe that the board of trustees of WorldCom at the time of the scandal would have wished that they had carefully looked into the background and leadership style of Mr. Ebber's and his co-conspirators to have checked for any signs of unethical behavior that many companies continue to blindly ignore.Barely about a year ago, Yahoo's former CEO was publicly humiliated, and subsequently fired by the company for â€Å"embellishing his academic credentials†. A very minor issue that could have been easily prevented, had the board of trustees of Yahoo looked thoroughly into Thompson's background by doing their due diligence. Unfortunately, the board of trustees of Yahoo failed at this task, much like what happened back in the late nineties with WorldCom and Ebber's. 5. You are a representative from the SEC.Briefly describe any sections of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that you would cite to either Mr. Sullivan or Mr. Ebber's when they refuse to comply with your request for information. Under the federal regulations and securities Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C. 78c(a)(47)), ref usal of any individual(s), or company(s) to conform to set accounting practices including external auditing by appropriate personnel (entities) will be liable to punitive actions set forth by federal legislations – up to or more than 25-years imprisonment and fines.Additionally, accounting and auditing practices by firms and individuals associated with a particular entity, or provide other services to any or such entities are prohibited to prevent conflict of interest, and accurate reporting of accounting practices. All of which were corporate infractions engaged in by Mr. Ebber's and his co-conspirators at WorldCom. 6. The E/R ratios of other telecommunications companies during the late 1990’s hovered around 50% or at best high 40%. If you were an investor, would you have invested in WorldCom? I probably would have.Despite the fact that WorldCom's E/R ratio seems to have been lower than its competitors , which should have raised a red flag in any potential investors m ind. However, like my decision to still invest in WorldCom despite its â€Å"too good to be E/R ratios†, many investors back then may have ignored what was obvious because WorldCom's â€Å"cooked books† from previous years all â€Å"seemed financially sound†, thanks to Ebber's and his co-conspirators great efforts at evading external auditors, fooling the public and its shareholders, and â€Å"muscling† junior employees to cover up its â€Å"shady accounting practices†.So naturally, any potential investor would probably back then have made the same mistake of investing in WorldCom. Obviously, not expensing largest operating expense â€Å"line costs† – incurred to gain access to other carriers networks to allow WorldCom to complete customers calls, as reported in its SEC filings will make its E/R ratio lower compared to WorldCom's competitors, resulting in an â€Å"inflated performance† – overstatement of earnings and und erstatement of operating expenses. 7. Contrast the roles of Vinson and Cooper in the case.Should Vinson have been charged with committing crime? According to the section â€Å"Resolution of Ethical Conflict† in the Institute of Management Accountants' Code of Ethics, how should employees proceed when under pressure by senior managers to engage in unethical behavior? As stated by James Comey, the U. S. attorney that prosecuted Ms. Vinson's case, â€Å"just following orders† is not an excuse to break the law. Why? Because, like many accounting professionals, Ms. Vinson knew right from wrong as it pertains to the prescriptive law of accounting ethical practices.In her own statement and admissions to prosecutors during the initial stages of her prosecution, and attempt to become a witness for the prosecution to gain leniency. (Pulliam, 2003). She (Ms. Vinson) stated that â€Å"each time she was ordered to â€Å"cook† or cover unethical accounting practices, she tho ught and hoped it will be the last time she caved in for such unscrupulous activities. Unfortunately, she kept on caving for years till the scandal was uncovered†. In light of the facts, and Ms.Vinson and Cooper's knowledge of right and wrong concerning the ethical practices of their chosen professions, it is appropriate for both of them to have been held liable for conspiring and engaging in such fraudulent activities as purported by WorldCom. As outlined by the IMA, accounting professionals in any company that are micro-managed, â€Å"muscled†, or coerced to engage in any fraudulent activities or witness any such improprieties, should first report the issue to an immediate supervisor that is not involve in such activities.In the event such option does not exist, one should then report the issue to a higher management staff that is not involved in such impropriety. it's also advisable for one to seek legal counseling with a private attorney about how to proceed in such matters n the event that reporting to an external body is imminent. Reference:PULLIAM, S. , Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Online, June 23, 2003| |

Personal statement for law school Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

For law school - Personal Statement Example The officer not considering the situation, gave me a ticket and helped the other car to speed off, even after the lights turned to a stop sign. To my surprise, the officer implicated me and used the events to my disadvantage. He made severe decisions that led me into trouble not considering that the insurance for my car had expired. As a result, my insurer came into the mix attracting more trouble. The realization of this unjust treatment for the less privileged was extremely empowering. I knew that concentrating on the officer’s hostility would only reinforce my fear and the prejudice he had against me bearing in mind it was the other car that was on the wrong. My passion for equality and social justice kept growing until now when I wish to have a chance to participate in the fight against the unprivileged while at the same time empowering others. It is with this enthusiasm that I have great passion and interest for

The co-chaperones of heat shock proteins and disease Literature review

The co-chaperones of heat shock proteins and disease - Literature review Example From the accidental discovery of the HSPs, they continue to display important roles in the cell integrity. Research shows that the dysfunction of Mitochondrial in the skeletal muscles has been said to be important in a manner of T2DM. They do this by either reducing the ability to oxidize the fatty acids that lead to the accumulation of deleterious lipid species in the surrounding tissues such as the liver and the skeletal muscles and also by altering the cellular state of Redox. This mini-review will focus on defining and analyzing the functionalities of the heat shock proteins. The presence of environmental stress in a cell stops or slows its ability to carry out most of its functions. These features include transport processes, RNA, DNA and protein synthesis. The model of the stress response by the HSPs is usually an abrupt rise in the external temperature known as the heat shock. Ferruccio Ritossa did the discovery of the heat shock response in 1962; he discovered them when he noticed an enlargement in some of the special sections of the heat shock puffs made after a heat treatment of the flies [1]. It later came clear that the segments contained particular forms of proteins known as the heat shock proteins. These types of proteins are induced by a massive variety of impulses apart from the thermal shock in the cells of an organism. HSPs usually play an important part in preventing various diseases with a fast rising role in the field of clinical practice. The functions of the HSPs in usually essential for the homeostasis of all the living cells, and often become vital in diseases when our bodily cells have to keep up with a stressful environment. The advancement of our knowledge of the functions and the biochemistry of HSPs enable us to acquire more tools to give a mark to the patients. The advancements also make us to have close observations and improvements in the